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I. Introduction  
Economic incentives explain the perpetuation of child exploitation and human trafficking 
in Thailand and can offer the solution to its mitigation and eventual abolition. Despite the 
promulgation of international conventions and a variety of domestic statutes that combat 
exploitation and trafficking, the problem still persists in brothels, factories, boats, street corners, 
and private residences located all around Thailand. The beginning of this problem is rooted in the 
economic benefits of exploitation, namely high profit at a low cost of investment with little risk 
of detection or punishment. The end of such exploitation could also rest on the strategic 
implementation of economic incentives. Economic motivation as a carrot and stick may spur 
countries to create and implement sustainable and effective anti-trafficking initiatives. Moreover, 
such initiatives paired with the economic empowerment of children susceptible to exploitation 
and trafficking may help solve the problem.  
II. International Recognition of Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking 
In the last decade, the international community has recognized the plight of human 
trafficking, prompting the promulgation of globally-recognized treaties. In 1989, the United 
Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”). Specifically designed to 
further the safety and well-being of children across the world, the CRC establishes four core 
principles including “non-discrimination, consideration of the ‘best interests of the child’; the 
right to life, survival and development; and respect for the views of the child.”1 The CRC 
                                                 
1 Lynne Marie Kohm, Suffer the Little Children: How the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the 
Child Has Not Supported Children, 22 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. 57 (2009) (citing Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, http:// www.unicef.org/crc/index_protecting.html (last visited June 25, 
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demands that states recognize the child’s right to be protected from economic exploitation, 
sexual exploitation, and any and all other forms of exploitation detrimental to the welfare of the 
child.2 Addressing gaps in children’s protection, the United Nations further adopted the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution 
and Child Pornography.3 This protocol calls on states to more effectively prosecute those who 
engage in the most egregious crimes committed against children including the commodification 
of children’s bodies and the sale of child pornography.4 Moreover, the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children directs states to 
combat trafficking in persons where trafficking is defined as 
“the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of 
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, 
of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation.” 5 
Specifically, the Protocol directs nation states to criminalize trafficking, protect victims, and 
establish policies and programs to combat trafficking in persons.6  Despite such formal 
                                                 
2018). 
2 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.  
3 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227. 
4 Id.  
5 U.N., Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, Dec. 12, 2000.  
6 Id. 
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international instruction to combat human trafficking and child exploitation, the problem still 
exists around the world, in countries that have signed and ratified these treaties. 
III. A Brief Overview of Child Exploitation in Thailand  
In Thailand, especially, children are constantly trafficked and exploited. These exploited 
children are either forcibly taken from their home countries or come to Thailand voluntarily to 
escape poverty in their home country. The victims of trafficking in Thailand include Thai and 
foreign nationals from the hills of northern and southern Thailand, Burma, Laos, Malaysia, and 
Cambodia.7 Thai-born and foreign nationals abuse these children in brothels, massage parlors, 
bars, hotels, and private residences.8 As early as the 1990’s, stories of child trafficking circulated 
the globe. For example, Time magazine published a story of the coerced prostitution of a girl 
taken from her home in Chiang Rai who was forced to engage with clients in the sex tourism 
hotspot of Phuket.9 A recent raid of one of Bangkok’s largest soapy massage parlors led to the 
identification of minors as young as twelve-years who were forced to provide sexual services to 
clients.10 In recent years, a more nuanced view of child trafficking has emerged as reports of 
“voluntary child prostitution” were brought into the spotlight. These reports claim that children 
                                                 
7 U.S. Dep’t of State, 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report: Tier 2 Watch List, Office to Monitor 
and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 
https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2017/271297.htm (last visited June 23, 2018).  
8 Id. 
9 Heather Montgomery, Defining Child Trafficking & Child Prostitution: The Case of Thailand, 
9 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 774, 782-83 (2011) (citing Margot Hornblower, Prostitution: The Skin 
Trade, TIME, June 21, 1993, at 28).  
10 Yvonne Bohwongprasert, Going from Strength to Strength, Bankgkok Post, Feb. 19, 2018, 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/lifestyle/social-and-lifestyle/1414415/going-from-strength-to-
strength.  
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may not be forcibly taken from their homes or sold into slavery by their families as often as the 
popular media indicates. Rather, these children voluntarily “entertain” their guests, viewing the 
selling of their bodies as an independent choice, a necessary means to provide for their families. 
Other forms of exploitation run rampant in the streets of Thailand.  While not always sexually 
exploited, children in Thailand can be abused in myriad different ways. Some children are forced 
to sell flowers and beg on busy streets, or work as domestic helpers in big cities.11 Others are 
recruited by military groups in the southern regions of Thailand and trained to commit arson,  
serve as scouts, and accomplish other tasks to further the groups’ agenda.12 Lastly, children are 
overworked, underpaid, and subjected to dangerous working conditions in areas of voluntary 
employment like the seafood industry.13 In summary, Thailand is home to a thriving practice of 
child trafficking and exploitation of different kinds. 
IV. Economic Incentives as the Root of the Problem  
Using a simple cost-benefit analysis as applied to the two main kinds of actors: 1) the 
trafficker/employer and 2) the trafficked victim, I argue that child exploitation is most 
prominently rooted in the incentives attached to different economic benefits resulting from the 
use of child exploitation, which include trafficking, prostitution, and other forms of hard labor.  
                                                 
11 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report: Tier 2 Watch List, supra note 8  
12 Id.  
13 The Asia Foundation & ILO, Migrant and Child Labor in Thailand’s Shrimp and Seafood 
Supply Chains: Labor Conditions and the Decision to Study or Work (Sept. 
2015), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-
bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_402971.pdf. 
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A. Traffickers and Employers 
The promise of increased profits at low cost drives the continuation of child exploitation 
and human trafficking. Because of the significant price of labor, employers of a variety of 
different firms recruit trafficked victims. Compared to the cost of a slave in the 1800’s, today’s 
trafficked individual is a low-cost purchase of a few hundred to a few thousand dollars, 
depending on the industry.14 Such an investment is sure to yield a high rate of return because of 
the possibility of the continuous labor potential of a trafficked individual. This high return on 
investment is particularly true for children whose age translates to significantly more years of 
working potential relative to an adult trafficked victim, presuming the children work under 
conditions that enable them to remain sufficiently healthy. If a trafficked victim escapes, dies or 
otherwise fails to yield an optimal level of productivity that satisfies the employer’s bottom line, 
the trafficked victim can be easily disposed and replaced.15 Moreover, by employing trafficked 
individuals, employers save significant amounts on fair wages and funds spent on complying 
with sufficient working condition regulations, constitutional rights, safety standards, and 
employee benefits.16  
Because the labor of trafficked victims remains in high demand, traffickers are 
economically incentivized to continue recruiting these victims. While some employers may act 
as the actual trafficker, in the majority of these instances, the traffickers serve as the 
                                                 
14 Elizabeth M. Wheaton, et al., Economics of Human Trafficking, 48 Int’l Migration 114 (2010); 
Siddharth Kara, Supply and Demand: Human Trafficking in the Global Economy, 33 Harvard 
Int’l Rev. 66 (2011).  
15 Wheaton et al., supra note 16.  
16 Wheaton, et al., supra note 16  
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intermediaries that recruit laborers for the employer.17 Like the employer, the trafficker is 
interested in turning a profit by engaging in this illicit industry. Depending on the market, the 
average revenue of a trafficked victim can reach $13,000, a small fortune compared to the costs 
incurred.18 
The actualization of certain costs associated with trafficking individuals are minimal for 
both employers and traffickers. While some of these different costs are directly translatable to a 
cash amount, most costs for both the employer and trafficker manifest in certain risks. For the 
employer, loss of reputation, and therefore, lack of business, may result from any public 
discovery of the use of trafficked labor. Such a risk will unlikely manifest in industries such as 
sex tourism. In environments like brothels and karaoke bars, the clients may have more to lose 
from any kind of public disclosure of their engagement in that business. Moreover, the level of 
the supply chain in which trafficking takes place in the agricultural and fishing industries may 
prove too attenuated from the finished good to raise consumer concern to a level that would 
place the employer or trafficker in any real jeopardy. In the face of operational, physical, 
psychological, and criminal costs, traffickers often choose the quick and lucrative benefit of 
trafficking.19 Moreover, the risk of detection is slim to none for both employers and trafficked 
victims. While there may be laws that have been passed that criminalize trafficking and purport 
to place the needs of the victim first, those laws are poorly implemented, if implemented at all.20 
                                                 
17 Wheaton, et al., supra note 16  
18 Wheaton, et al., supra note 16. 
19 Id. 
20 Kara, supra note 16.  
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If such laws are acted upon, the prison sentences and economic penalties are weak and rarely 
enforceable.21 Moreover, the corruption of law enforcement and the judiciary decrease any 
possibility of punishment.  
B. Trafficked Victim  
Economic incentives cause children to enter or stay in scenarios of exploitation. While 
stories of trafficking often follow the same formula of trickery and exploitation, recent literature 
has analyzed children’s autonomous decisions to enter a life of exploitation. Prompted by filial 
duty to contribute economically to the family, girls may “voluntarily” submit themselves to 
being trafficked.22 For some, sex work is a way to make money, gain protection, and live 
independently. Sex work is seen as a means to an end, a method of contributing to the family, 
rather than a source of shame. In a case study of a rural Thai community where children 
voluntarily sold themselves to Western clients, interviews with children revealed that prostitution 
was seen as the better alternative to working in a sweatshop, scavenging for garbage, begging, or 
toiling for a hairdresser.23  
By adopting a more detached view of their situation, children choose to avoid the reality 
of serious costs associated with trafficking. AIDS, sexually-transmitted diseases of all kinds, 
PTSD, and depression, are few of the infinite number of problems that sexual and physical 
exploitation may produce. For those who voluntarily acquiesce to child prostitution and 
                                                 
21 Id.  
22 Crawford, supra note 12.  
23 Montgomery, supra note 10.  
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exploitation, such possibilities are set aside. The height of these decisions are seen in children’s 
decisions to stay within scenario of exploitation. 
Regardless of the way in which they entered, some children may stay voluntarily. 
Specifically, some children who were exploited decide not to leave their lifestyle. Others choose 
to return to work in the sex industry after escaping it in the first instance. The perks of 
prostitution may enable the children to disassociate their current state from any labels of harm 
like trafficking and prostitution. Moreover, children view their abusers as clients.24 In the same 
case study previously cited, the Western clients were not perceived as rapists by the community, 
but as friends, and protectors of the child and the child’s family.25  The gifts the clients produce, 
coupled with the money they exchanged for sex bought the clients the loyalty of the children 
they harmed. This loyalty often translated to insulation from any kind of investigation or public 
prosecution. In Thailand, a family in a particular impoverished community offered character 
references on behalf of a Western client who was suspected of child trafficking and 
exploitation.26 Such actions seem irrational, but these children’s decisions may serve as logical 
methods of psychologically coping with the horror of their situation. Changing their perspective 
and avoiding the reality of their exploitation by translating it to a more digestible scenario may 
help these children survive.  
While a disillusioned view of their circumstances may attribute to the children’s choice in 
staying, the material wealth gained from prostitution may also compel them to stay. For those 
                                                 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id.  
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who have the option of leaving, they choose not to abandon their life of comfort where they are 
able to acquire money, new clothing, a mobile phone, and an urban home for the first time. 27 
While such an observation can be easily deemed materialistic and superficial, these children’s 
motives must be taken within the context of their extreme poverty. In the face of the need to 
survive and the obligation to financially provide for their families, prostitution is simply the 
“least bad option.”28 For those without legal status, sex work may be the only kind of 
employment they are able to find.29The inability to speak and understand Thai and a lack of any 
kind of labor skill, limit employment choices for many children. When burdened with the plight 
of poverty and violence, the act of staying or returning to a life of exploitation can never truly be 
a fully autonomous decision. It may not be correctly characterized as a choice at all. 
In contrast to those who “voluntarily” stay, there are children in sex and other labor-
intensive industries who are not able to escape. Restriction on children’s ability to leave is made 
through different mechanisms of exploitation that employers can use against their trafficked 
victims. While chains may still be used in some instances around the world, employers and 
traffickers hold their victims captive through more discrete means. Debt bondage is a common 
way in which employers keep their trafficked employees. By setting an egregiously significant 
and arbitrary debt, charging inflated fees for room and board, and keeping wages at a low rate, 
employers manipulate the trafficked individuals to continue working until their debt is paid.30 
                                                 
27 Id. at 840.  
28 Montgomery, supra, note 10.  
29 Id. 
30 See Stephanie Hepburn & Rita Simon, Hidden in Plain Sight: Human Trafficking in the United 
States, 27 Gend. Issues 1 (2010).  
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This type of exploitation is especially effective for victims trafficked outside of their home 
country whose forms of identification are confiscated until their debt is settled. Such restriction 
on the victim’s freedom to leave the workplace supplemented by threats of deportation and 
violence aimed at the trafficked individuals or their families abroad are other common, proven 
methods of exploitation. Where such blatant abuse is the norm, international and state 
intervention is necessary.  
V.  Economic Incentives as the Solution   
A. TIP Reports Affect the Internalization of International Obligations  
The main source of international motivation is the U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking 
in Persons (TIP) Report. While the TIP reports may seem to be a source of social motivation 
(e.g. a form of naming and shaming), the reports serve as the catalyst for economic sanctions, a 
proven method of incentivizing countries to internalize international obligations. Sanctions can 
include the withholding of “non-humanitarian aid, non-trade-related assistance, and certain 
development-related assistance and aid from international financial institutions, specifically, the 
International Monetary Fund and multilateral development banks such as the World Bank.”31 
The TIP report ranks countries according to certain data on human trafficking, including whether 
the countries are destination states of human trafficking, the degree of government intervention 
on behalf of trafficked victims, and the potential for further government action to combat human 
trafficking in light of the government’s economic ability and overall capacity.32 Each country is 
                                                 
31 Catherine Renshaw, Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia: Unconvering the Dynamics of State 
Commitment and Compliance, 37 Mich. J. of Int'l L 611 (2016). 
32 Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat 
Human Trafficking, 27 Mich. J. of Int’l L. 437 (2006) (citing Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
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given a certain ranking: 1) Tier 1, full compliance with the minimum standards; 2) Tier 2, no full 
compliance, but has demonstrated significant efforts to reach full compliance; and 3) no 
compliance, and has not demonstrated significant efforts to do so.33 Many have criticized the TIP 
reports, taking issue with the possibility that U.S. economic sanctions, rather than a genuine 
desire to eradicate human trafficking are motivating state-led initiatives.34 Moreover, countries 
who have been ranked by the U.S. State Department find fault in the method by which countries 
are designated their rankings. Moreover, it is argued that Thailand’s initiatives far surpass the 
efforts of other countries who are also given Tier 2 status.35 On the International Immersion 
Program trip to Thailand, my discussion with former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva revealed 
his frustration with the way in which Thailand had been ranked during his tenure.36 
Understandably, the United States is limited in the way in which they can surmise every 
country’s anti-trafficking efforts. The statutes put in place and the statistics reported on paper are 
but a small glimpse of the larger efforts to combat human trafficking and child exploitation on 
the ground. While such criticisms may be credible, there is still strong evidence that the TIP 
                                                 
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386 § 2A, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) [hereinafter TVPA], as supplemented 
by the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 
Stat. 2875 [hereinafter 2003 TVPRA], and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 TVPRA] (codified at 
22 U.S.C. § 7101)). 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 456. 
35 Ralph Simpson and Peerasit Kamnuansilpa, Slavery Report Undervalues Thai Efforts, 
Bangkok Post, Jul. 1, 2017, https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1278851/slavery-
report-undervalues-thai-efforts.  
 
36 Personal communication. 
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reports have undeniably affected international efforts to combat human trafficking, particularly 
in Thailand.  
B. Thailand’s Response to Economic Incentives 
Succumbed to the pressure of its international audience, Thailand has made strides to end 
the trafficking and exploitation of children. In light of Thailand’s consistent Tier 2 designation 
during the past few years, the government has created different laws and initiated programs and 
partnerships to fully comply with the minimum U.S. standards. In 2008, Thailand passed the 
Prevention and Suppression of Human Trafficking Act, the revisions to which include severe 
penalties for trafficking.37 On April 3, 2013, the Ministry of Social Development and Human 
Security drafted new anti-trafficking laws in light of TIP-report-related allegations that Thailand 
seafood exports were affected by child labor and human trafficking.38 In late 2015, Thailand 
passed a law criminalizing the possession of child pornography.39 Later that same year, the 
Thailand Internet Crimes Against Children (TICAC) Task Force collaborated with the U.S. 
National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children to share information about victims and 
abusers.40 The Thai government maximized these efforts by increasing the TICAC staff from 
                                                 
37 John Quinley III, Why Does Human Trafficking Persist in Thailand, Asia Dialogue (Jan. 11, 
2018), http://theasiadialogue.com/2018/01/11/thailands-anti-trafficking-framework-is-strong-so-
why-does-the-crime-persist/.  
38 Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, Invitation to Conduct 
News Reporting and Attend the Press Briefing for the Study Tour of the Diplomatic Corps, (Jan. 
11, 2013), http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/14/31530-Invitationto- conduct-news-
reporting-and-attend-th.html. 
39 Matthew Friedman & Peerasit Kamnuansilpa, Let’s Make Thailand a Safe Haven for Kids, 
Bangkok Post, Dec. 3, 2016, https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1150653/lets-make-
thailand-a-safe-haven-for-kids. 
40 Id. 
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four to fifteen and investing in the recruitment and training of TICAC and Homeland Secruity 
Investigations (HIS).41 In 2016, the Thai government passed a Cabinet resolution that purported 
to protect formal witness of trafficking and provide work permits for trafficking survivors.42 
Moreover, the Thai government approved regulations to grant citizenship to stateless or 
unaccompanied children.43 Thailand has also denied entry to 2,054 known foreign sex offenders 
in 2016 and implemented initiatives to collaborate with tourists on identifying trafficked 
victims.44 Funding allocations of the Thai government is also indicative of their efforts to combat 
human trafficking. The Thai government increased funding for anti-trafficking efforts from 2.08 
billion baht ($58.15 million) in the 2016 fiscal year to 2.58 billion baht ($72.1 million) in the 
2017 fiscal year.45 In 2017, the Thai judiciary brought down a landmark case in the world of 
human trafficking, sentencing sixty-two defendants, including a formal army general, to prison 
for twenty-seven years for trafficking and organized crime.46 Even after the rise of the military 
junta and the launch of its 20th Constitution, Thailand purports to continue the fight against 
human trafficking. For example, Norachit Sinhaseni, Spokesman of the Constitution Drafting 
                                                 
41 Prangthong Jitcharoenkul & Kornchanok Raksaseri, US, Thai Networks Join to Find Missing, 
Exploited Children, Bangkok Post, Mar. 30, 2017, 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general/1223564/us-thai-networks-join-to-find-missing-
exploited-children. 
42 Quinley, supra note 38. 
43 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report: Tier 2 Watch List, supra note 8. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Aria Bendix, Dozens Found Guilty in Thailand’s Largest Human Trafficking Trial, The 
Atlantic, July 20, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/07/dozens-found-guilty-
in-thailands-largest-human-trafficking-trial/534279/. 
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Committee and the former Ambassador of Thailand to the United Nations, spoke of the newly 
established Human Rights Commission set in Thailand’s new Constitution.47 
C. Problems that Persist Despite Thailand’s Human Rights Initiatives 
Thailand’s efforts to combat trafficking and exploitation are not an infallible solution to 
the problem of human trafficking. Victims may be harmed more than they are helped by 
government intervention. In 1993, Asia Watch reported hideous treatment of Burmese victims 
working in brothels.48 Rather than receiving treatment for their abuse, they were arrested by Thai 
police and deported back to Burma where the HIV-positive victims were killed.49 While such 
treatment may be mitigated by better training of the Thai law enforcement, vestiges of that 
maltreatment still remain. Women and girls who are subjected to brothel raids by law 
enforcement, may be fined, incarcerated, and abused by the same officials who are tasked with 
their rescue.50 Other children may be arrested, detained in youth correctional facilities, and 
prosecuted under immigration, prostitution, and illegal fishing charges.51 After this kind of 
treatment, these children are left on the streets, even more vulnerable than when they were first 
trafficked. As already analyzed, human trafficking victims may be re-victimized after their initial 
                                                 
47 Personal communication. 
48 Montgomery, supra note 10.  
49 Id. 
50 Erin Kamler, Carrots, Sticks and the TIP Report: Understanding the US Government’s Anti-
Trafficking Efforts in Southeast Asia, East by Southeast (June 26, 2014, 5:09 PM), 
http://www.eastbysoutheast.com/carrots-sticks-tip-report-understanding-us-governments-anti-
trafficking-efforts-southeast-asia/#. 
51 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report: Tier 2 Watch List, supra note 8. 
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rescue. Thailand needs to focus on the foundational causes of children’s exploitation—namely, 
the economic disparity of trafficking and exploited victims.  
D. A Victim-Based Approach to Rescue  
Economic empowerment is most effective when paired with a comprehensive, victim-
based framework of rescue. I propose that the Thai government adopt initiatives allowing for 
better advocacy of the best interests of the child. The Young Center for Immigrant Children’s 
Rights, an organization developed in the United States, pairs Child Advocates with children in 
removal proceedings.52 Different from the role of a defense attorney, the Child Advocate 
represents the best interests of the child. The Advocate gains the child’s trust through in-person 
contact, gathers information about the child’s story, and puts together a best interest 
recommendation. Such a system would enable the Thai government to determine how best to 
help the child—filling a crucial gap of child advocacy in light of wanting pro bono services. This 
program can be implemented into Thailand’s existing initiatives including the Hug Project’s 
Child Advocacy Center.53 While the Child Advocacy Center has done significant work in 
providing “one-stop care” for victims, the role of the Child Advocates should not be limited to 
immediate needs like food or counseling. Child advocates should connect children with non-
profit organizations who are willing to train the children with different skills and crafts, enabling 
them to create businesses and make money outside of labor trafficking. Fair wages will enable 
them to support themselves as well as their family, satisfying filial obligations. By empowering 
                                                 
52 https://www.theyoungcenter.org (last visited June 25, 2018). 
53 http://www.hugproject.org/about-us/ (last visited June 25, 2018); Friedman & Kamnuansilpa, 
supra note 41.  
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children with the skills they need to create a livelihood for themselves, Child Advocates and non-
profit partnerships can enable children to leave the world of human trafficking for good. The end 
of child trafficking and exploitation can be found in the economic empowerment of vulnerable 
children.  
VI. Conclusion 
While economic incentives can help explain the roots of human trafficking and child 
exploitation, the end of child trafficking and exploitation can be found in the economic 
empowerment of vulnerable children. Notably, some economic programs already exist in 
Thailand. The Thai government, with support from the Thai family, established scholarships that 
provided money to families who continued to send their daughters to school until they were 
sixteen.54 However, such a program is expensive and unsustainable absent a steady source of 
funding.55 Further studies can be done on ex-ante, sustainable economic initiatives that serve as 
preventative measures to protect children from exploitation. 
                                                 
54 Montgomery, supra note 10.  
55 See id. 
